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This research focuses on the current regulations and policies of the Republic 
of Korea (R.O.K.) governing contract types to be used. 
The objectives of this research are: (1) to review the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) related to contract types, (2) to identify major elements for the • 
selection of appropriate contract type, (3) to evaluate current R.O.K regulations and 
laws which define contract type application, ( 4) to compare the FAR with that of 
R.O.K. regulation, (5) to recommend a proposal to change the R.O.K. regulations 
for best value procurement. 
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Immediate threats to South Korea's security come from 
North Korea. Despite the world-wide bankruptcy of communist 
ideology, North Korea still clings to its own fanatical ideas 
under the banner of 11 line in our own way 11 • North Korea 
continues to strengthen its armed forces in spite of economic 
difficulties. Furthermore, North Korea is suspected of having 
both the intention and capability of developing nuclear 
devices. It is widely thought that North Korea has already 
developed a nuclear explosive device of some sort or is on the 
verge of acquiring one or two. If the North becomes a nuclear 
weapon state, it forces South Korea to be engaged in a heated 
arms race. 
In retrospect, over the last 40 years, South and North 
Korea have been in an arms race for self-defense purposes. 
South Korea has had to allocate its national resources, human 
and material, for its defense. South Korea may need 1- 1.5 
percent of its population for its standing troops, that is, 
according to the current figure, 400,000 as the minimum and 
900,000 the maximum, based on practical necessity and 
affordability. Also South Korea may have to allocate 3-4 
percent of its total gross national product (GNP) for its 
defense with special emphasis on modernizing its equipment. 
South Korea is currently allocating about 3.7 percent of its 
GNP for defense, whereas, the North allocates 20-25 percent. 
[Ref.1: p.38] While South Korea maintains 655,000 troops in 
total, the North more than 1,000,000. [Ref.2] 
Meanwhile, the United states security assistance to South 
Korea has not only played an important deterrence role, but 
contributed largely to the improvement of its defense 
capability and overall economy. But as the Cold-War World was 
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ended, the U.S. strategy was changed. Jimmy Carter's 1976 
campaign platform had a heavy domestic focus and proposed 
defense cuts. Clinton's newer Administration has placed heavy 
emphasis on his agenda for domestic economic renewal. [Re£.3: 
p.32] As a result, the U.S. government plans to withdrawal 
U.S. forces deployed in foreign countries, including South 
Korea. Through the threat posed by North Korea's suspected 
nuclear weapons program suspended a phased reduction of 
U.S.troops stationed in South Korea. South Korea has 
committed to assuming a progressively larger share of the 
burden and paying one-third of the annual cost of U.S. forces 
in Korea by 1995. Therefore, the strain of additional defense 
makes South Korea take on the burden of rebuilding the 
self-defense system in a short period of time. 
When the U.S. withdrawal is completed, according to the 
South Korean Department of Defense (DOD), it will cost more 
than $ 5. 2 billion to get the replacement strength. This 
means that the sum of added cost along with the present 
expenditure for the national defense will be up to 8 percent 
of GNP. [Ref.9: p.11] 
Consequently, the change of U.S. defense strategy forces 
the South to cornrni t increased budget for its defense and 
requlres more efficient allocation of resources to achieve its 
new strategy. 
Under this situation, it is critical that South Korea 
should find a more efficient allocation of its defense budget 
so as to achieve its new strategy. Considering the current 
Korean DOD acquisition process, DOD will not be able to meet 
the new strategy without dramatic changes in its acquisition 
process from determining what the DOD needs, to logistic 
support. In addition, the Korean DOD acquisition regulations 
and policies require modification as well, and these must be 
an integral part of changes in acquisition process. Recently, 
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Korean DOD has placed particular emphasis on the changes of 
DOD regulations in order to make the existing contract system 
more efficient. In fact, Korean DOD senior officials have 
recognized that there were acquisition problems which are 
primarily attributed to a lack of effective DOD regulations. 
And they have also known that there was waste, and abuse of 
defense funds by the use of inappropriate contract types. 
Thus DOD began to make an effort to change and develop the DOD 
regulations which can regulate the contract system effectively 
- especially the contract type to be used. To follow these 
recent DOD activities, this thesis focuses on the revision of 
Korean DOD regulations for contract types. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this research are: 
(1) to review contract types described in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation. (FAR) 
(2) to identify the major elements for the selection of 
appropriate contract type. 
(3) to evaluate current the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) 
regulations and laws which define contract type 
application. 
(4) to compare the FAR and DOD policy with that of R.O.K. 
regulations. 
(5) to recommend a proposal to change the R.O.K. 
regulations for best value procurement. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
What are the principal problems experienced in the 
use of current contract types and how might the Korean DOD 
change acquisition regulations for contract types? 
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2. Subsidiary Questions 
a. What is the current state of the DOD contracting 
system? 
b. What are the current contract types authorized to 
be used under DOD regulations? 
c. Which statutes, regulations and policies have been 
applied to the use of contract types in field 
contracting? 
d. What changes should be made to the regulations 
governing contract types suited to the DOD field 
contracting environment? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
There are several categories of source documents: 
1. available books, theses on the subject of the FAR and 
contract types. 
2. Federal Government Regulations; FAR, DFARS. 
3. congressional hearings and reports of the General 
Accounting Office(GAO). 
4. periodicals and newspapers. 
5. additional information from some R. 0. K. DOD officials. 
E. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The scope of this study is limited to the FAR, DFARS and 
R. 0. K. DOD Regulations applying to contract type. Other 
regulations and government acts are not included since they 
are too broad in application. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH 
This research contains four chapters. Chapter I gives an 
introduction and the research objectives. Chapter II 
presents the background information on and definition of 
contract types described in the FAR/DFARS. Chapter III deals 
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with R.O.K. DOD regulations and contract system. Chapter IV 
provides conclusions and recommendations for a proposal to 





The acquisition of goods and serv1ces by government 
entails government contracts with individuals or firms from 
various industries. A major concern of government acquisition 
and contracting is 11 best value buying II which ensures the 
purchase of a quality product at terms that represent the best 
overall value to the buyer. Therefore, government needs 
comprehensive legislation and regulations to control 
government acquisition. 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is a U.S. 
government-wide contracting regulation. 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation system is established 
for the codification and publication of uniform policies 
and procedures for all executive agencies. The Federal 
Acquisition Regulation System consists of the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation(FAR), which is the primary 
document, and agency acquisition regulations that 
implement or supplement the FAR. [Ref.4] 
The FAR is implemented by departments and agencies 
through their own acquisition regulations which are limited in 
subject matter, to: (1) regulations necessary to implement FAR 
throughout the agency and (2) such additional policies, 
procedures, solicitation provisions and clauses as are 
required by the specific needs of the agency. [Ref.10] The 
FAR also provides guidance for selecting a contract 
appropriate to the circumstances of an acquisition. 
type 
It 
defines various types of contracts available to the government 
and describes their application, limitation and contract 
clauses. The FAR provides broad discretion to use the proper 
type of contract in a negotiated procurement, by emphasizing 
two basic principles: ( 1) the need to tailor the type of 
contract to the facts of each procurement, and ( 2) the 
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advantages of using fixed-price contract when possible. 
Generally, the U.S.Government uses three basic types of 
contracts, as follows. 
1. Fixed Price 
* firm-fixed pr1ce 
* fixed-price with economic price adjustment 
* fixed-price with redetermination 
* firm-fixed price, level-of-effort 
2. Incentive 
* fixed-price incentive 
* cost-plus-incentive fee 
3. Cost Type 
* cost-plus-fixed fee 
* cost-plus-award fee 
* cost sharing 
* cost contracts 
* time and materials 
* letter contacts 
The types of contracts noted above are categorized based 
on the degree of cost risk assumed by the Government and the 
contractor respectively. They range from firm-fixed-price, 
which places m1n1murn risk on the government, to 
cost-plus-fixed-fee, which places m1n1murn risk on the 
contractor. Henceforth, this chapter first briefly describes 
each contract type prescribed in the FAR, and second reflect 
contract types used. 
B. FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS 
Under the FAR, a contracting officer has a variety of 
fixed-price contracts from which to choose. These contracts 
are not subject to adjustment based on the contractor's cost 
experience. In fixed-price contracts, the contractor promises 
to deliver on time and to met the contract specifications. If 
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a contractor is late, or his product doesn't meet the 
specifications for acceptance, the Government may terminate 
the contract for default and not pay the contract. In these 
contracts, the contractor bears a tremendous risk and has the 
greatest potential for reward. Thus the higher the contractor 
perceives the cost risk to be, the higher he will price the 
contract to protect him. These contracts are appropriate for 
goods or services that can be objectively defined and for 
which the risk of performance is manageable. 
1. Fir.m-Fixed Price Contract (FFP) 
The FFP 1s not subject to any adjustment to its total 
pr1ce based on variation 1n the cost experience of the 
contractor in the performance of the contract. This type of 
contract places the maximum cost risk upon the contractor 
because he assumes full responsibility, in the form of profits 
and losses, for all costs under or over the contract's 
firm-fixed-price. Thus, the contractor has the maximum profit 
incentive for effective control of costs. This contract type 
imposes a minimum administrative burden upon the contracting 
parties. [Ref.4 :sec. 16.201.1] 
Use of the FFP contract is appropriate for acquiring 
off-the-shelf commercial products or commercial-type products, 
or other supplies or services with clear and definitive 
specifications. 
2. Fixed-Price with Economic Price Adjustment Contract 
(FPE) 
This type of contract is used when the contracting 
officer determines that its provisions are necessary to 
protect either the government or the contractor against 
significant economic fluctuations in labor or material costs, 
or to provide for contract price adjustment in the event of 
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changes in the contractor's established prices. The contract 
provides for the upward or downward adjustment of the stated 
contract price upon the occurrence of certain contingencies 
which are specifically defined. [Ref.4 :sec. 16.203.1] 
The adjustment clause should be as simple as possible, 
and adjustments normally should be made in accordance with 
regularly published indexes. The two indexes most commonly 
used are the Bureau of Labor Statisitics' s Producer Price 
Index ( for material) and the Wage Increase Series by Standard 
Industrial Classification (for labor) . [Ref .12: sec. 216.2] It 
should be noted that price adjustments of this type apply only 
to changes in labor rates and material costs, not to overhead 
and profit and not to increases in the amounts of labor or 
materials. This type of contract takes some of the risk away 
from the contractor, but there are still advantages for the 
government because contingencies which would otherwise be 
reflected in a high contract price can be identified and 
covered separately by a price adjustment clause. The 
contractor still shares the profit and losses in the ratio of 
0/100 as in the firm-fixed-price contract except ln the 
economlc prlce adjustment contract the fixed-price might be 
changed uslng the performance of the contract upon the 
occurrence of a specific event. 
3. Fixed-Price with Redeter.mination Contract (FPR) 
There are two types of FPR contracts: fixed-price with 
prospective price redetermination, and fixed-ceiling-price 
with retroactive price redetermination. The former provides 
for a firm-fixed-price for an initial period of contract 
deliveries or performance and for prospective price 
redetermination either upward or downward at a stated time or 
times during the performance of the contract. It also 
provides for a price ceiling, when appropriate. Once 
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established, ceiling prices are subject to adjustment only by 
reason of the operation of other contract clauses. 
[Ref.4:sec.16.205] 
The latter provides for a ceiling price and retroactive 
price redetermination after completion of the contract. The 
redetermined price should be negotiated so as to give weight 
to the management effectiveness and ingenuity exhibited by the 
contractor during performance, and the basis for such 
negotiation should be fully discussed with the contractor when 
this type of contract is negotiated. Because the price is 
redetermined on a completely retroactive base, this contract 
type (except for the price ceiling) does not provide the 
contractor with a calculable incentive for effective cost 
control. Once established, the ceiling price is subject to 
adjustment only if required by the operation of other contract 
clauses. [Ref.4: sec.16.206] 
Basically, redetermination as a means of 
different in concept from economic adjustment. 
pricing is 
In contracts 
with economic adjustment, the amounts of labor and materials 
required to complete the contract are known, but the labor 
rates or the pr1ces of material are unknown. In cases 
involving price redetermination, the amounts of labor and 
materials ( and in some cases their price also ) initially are 
unknown, but they become known with limited production 
experience. Because of labor and materials unknown, a 
firm-fixed-price contract initially would be impractical, 
however, enough is known so that a temporary estimated fixed 
price can be established. [Ref.11: p.282] The earlier the 
price determination can be made, the more effective this type 
of contract 1s. Thirty percent completion is typically a 
satisfactory redetermination point, and upward adjustment are 
normally limited to 10 percent or are tied directly to 
reliable and timely price indexes. 
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The FPR contract can not be used when use of a FFP or FPI 
contract would be appropriate, or when the contractor does not 
have an accounting system adequate for price redetermination. 
4. Firm-Fixed-Price, Level of Effort Term Contract 
[FFP {LOE)] 
This type of contract requires the contractor to devote 
a specified level of effort over a stated period of time for 
a fixed dollar amount. Normally, the contract requires 
submission by the contractor of reports which show the results 
achieved through application of the required level of effort; 
however, payment is based on effort expended rather than on 
results achieved. This type of contract can be useful tool, 
particularly in the Research and Exploratory Development 
categories when the work can not be clearly defined and the 
level of effort desired can be identified and agreed upon in 
advance of performance. [Ref.4 :sec. 16.207] 
In this contract type, the financial risk to the 
contractor is minimal Slnce payment lS based on effort 
expended and not results achieved. 
C. INCENTIVE CONTRACTS 
Incentives can be defined as promises of reward or 
penalty contingent upon specified performances by both 
parties. Thus,Incentives can be motivations for contractors 
to improve technological progress can provide cost saving. 
Most incentive contracts include only cost incentives, which 
take the form of a incentive sharing formula. Incentive 
contracts are appropriate when a firm-fixed-price contract lS 
not appropriate and the required supplies or services can be 
acquired at lower costs and, in certain instance, with 
improved delivery or technical performance, by relating the 
amount of profit or fee payable under the contract to the 
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contractor's performance. [Ref.4 : sec.16.4] 
There are two principal types of incentive contracts; (1) 
fixed-price-incentive and (2) a cost-plus-incentive fee 
contract. 
1. Fixed-Price Incentive Contract (FPI) 
This type of contract is generally used when a reasonable 
target price can be established but exact pricing lS 
impossible without payment of a contingency. There are two 
types of FPI contract; firm target and successive targets. 
Both provide for adjusting profit and establishing the final 
contract price by formula based on the relationship of final 
negotiated total cast to total target cost. The following 
elements are negotiated into the original contract 
(1) target cost 
(2) target profit 
(3) ceiling price 
(4) share ratio for establishing the final profit and 
price 
After performance of the contract, the final contract 
price is established in accordance with the formula. The 
share ratio should reflect the relative risks involved ln 
performance of the contract. Thus it may be appropriate to 
establish a share ratio which provides for the contractor to 
assume a considerable, or major, share of the risk and cost 
responsibility. The share ratio is expressed in the same 
manner as in the other types of contracts with the government 
number listed first. A typical share arrangement might be 
90/10, 80/20, etc. 
2. Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee Contract (CPIF) 
This contract type is a cost reimbursement contract, with 
provision for a fee adjusted by a formula in accordance with 
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the relationship that total allowable costs bear to target 
cost. It is similar to the FPI contract, but there is no 
ceiling price. Under CPIF contract, there is negotiated 
initially a target cost, a target fee, a minimum and maximum 
fee, and a fee adjustment formula. After performance of the 
contract, the fee payable to the contractor is determined in 
accordance with the negotiated formula. 
This type of contract is suitable for use primarily for 
development and test when cost unknowns are common. The 
purpose of the CPIF contract is to provide an incentive for 
the contractor to manage contract costs effectively and 
thereby achieve the maximum allowable fee. 
D. COST-REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACTS 
In cost-reimbursement contracts, the Government promises 
to pay all (allowable, allocable, and reasonable) costs 
incurred on the contract. [Ref. 5] This form of payment 
requlres the contractor to disclose and submit all cost 
records and accounts pertinent to the contract to the 
Government. Like firm-fixed price contracts, the contractor 
promises to make his best efforts to perform the desired work. 
These contracts establish an estimate of total cost for the 
purpose of obligating funds and establishing a ceiling that 
the contractor may not exceed without the approval of the 
contracting officer. 
1. Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contract (CPAF) 
This type of contract was pioneered by NASA when the 
agency was purchasing highly complex hardware and professional 
service in support of the space program. [Ref.11: p.286] The 
CPAF contract is a cost reimbursement type of contract with 
special fee provision. It provide a means of applying 
incentives in contracts which are not susceptible to finite 
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measurements of performance necessary for structuring 
incentive contracts. The CPAF contract is appropriate for : 
level of effort contracts for performance or services where 
mission feasibility lS established but measurement of 
achievement must be by subjective evaluation rather than 
objective measurement; and work which would have been placed 
under another type of contract if the performance objectives 
could be expressed in advance by definite milestones, targets 
or goals susceptible of measuring actual performance. The 
contract should provide for evaluation at stated intervals 
during contract performance, so that the contractor will 
periodically be made aware of the quality of his performance 
and will know in which areas improvement is expected. 
[Ref.4:sec.16.404.2] 
The fee established 1n a CPAF contract consists of two 
parts: (1) a fixed amount(base fee) which does not vary with 
performance, and (2) an award amount(award fee), in addition 
to the fixed amount, sufficient to provide motivation for 
excellence in contract performance in areas such as quality, 
timeliness, ingenuity, and cost effectiveness. The amount of 
award fee to be paid is based on a subjective evaluation by 
the government of the quality of the contractor's performance, 
judged in the light of criteria set forth in the contract. 
The manner of criteria used and the requirements which are 
represented will differ widely from one contract to another. 
The decision that award fee has been earned is based on the 
reports of performance made by the government personnel 
knowledgeable with respect to the contract requirements. This 
decision is a unilateral determination made by the government 
not subject to the Disputes clause of the contract. 
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2. Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contract (CPFF) 
The CPFF contract is a cost-reimbursement contract which 
provides for the payment of a fixed fee to the contractor. 
The fixed fee once negotiated does not vary with actual cost, 
but may be adjusted as a result of any subsequent changes in 
the work or serv1ces to be performed under the contract. 
[Ref.4:sec. 16.306] 
Because the fixed fee does not vary 
contractor's ability to control costs, 
1n relation to the 
the CPIF contract 
provides the contractor with only a minimum incentive for 
effective management control of costs. This type of contract 
is used primarily in research projects and exploratory studies 
where the level of effort required to achieve success, if it 
can be achieved at all, is unknown. 
3. Cost-Sharing Contract 
This 1s a cost reimbursement type contract, for use in 
research and development procurement, under which the 
contractor is reimbursed only for agreed portion of allowable 
costs. Generally, the basis for the contractor's agreement to 
absorb a portion of the cost is expectation of compensating 
benefits. [Ref.6] 
4. Cost Contract 
A cost contract is a cost reimbursement contract in which 
the contractor receives no fee. A cost contract may be 
appropriate for research and development work, particularly 
with nonprofit institutions, or other non profit organizations 
and for facilities contracts. [Ref. 4: sec. 16.3 02] 
Nonprofit institutions, such as universities, usually do 
research work for both government and industry, without the 
objective of making a profit. Such research is done under 
cost type contracts without a fee. Because universities do 
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much of the nation's pure research, 
applied research done by industry, 
contracts of this type are being 
as distinguished from 
a grouping number of 
used. Naturally, the 
universities recover all overhead costs, which generally 
include facilities costs and remuneration for personnel who 
work on the contracts. In recent tears, high technology firms 
have increased their use of this contract type. 
5. Time and Material Contract 
A time and materials contract provide for acquiring 
supplies or services on the basis of (1) direct labor hours at 
specified fixed hourly rates that include wages, overhead, 
general and administrative expenses, and profit and (2) 
material at cost,including, if appropriate, material handling 
costs as part of material costs. [Ref. 4: sec .16. 601] A 
variation of the time and materials type of contract is called 
a labor-hour contract. In this type of contract, materials 
are not supplied by the contractor, however, other costs are 
agreed to as in time and materials contracts. The time and 
materials contract is used only where it is not possible at 
the time of placing the contract to estimate the extent or 
duration of the work or to anticipate costs with any 
reasonable degree of confidence. Particular care should be 
exercised in the use of this type of contract since its nature 
does not encourage effective management control. 
essential that this type of contract be used 
Thus it is 
only where 
provision is made for adequate controls, including appropriate 
surveillance by government personnel during performance, to 
give reasonable assurance that inefficient or wasteful methods 
are not being used. 
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6. Letter Contract 
A letter contract is a written preliminary contractual 
instrument that authorizes the contractor to begin immediately 
manufacturing supplies or performing services. The contractor 
can prepare drawings, obtain required materials, and start 
actual production. Under letter contracts, the contractor lS 
guaranteed reimbursement for costs up to a specific unit. 
E. SUMMARY 
The type of contract determines how to the risk for cost 
of performance is shared between the parties. Selection of 
the appropriate contract type for the particular procurement 
lS one of the most important decision for a contracting 
officer. Contract types most likely to motivate contractors 
to perform at optimal levels and to best service the 
Government's interest shall be chosen. The FAR provides the 
contracting officer with many factors to consider in selecting 












type and complexity of the requirement 
urgency of the requirement 
period of performance or length of production run 
contractor's technical capability and financial 
responsibility 
(8) adequacy of the contractor's accounting system 
(9) concurrent contracts 
(10) extent and nature of proposed subcontracting 
Under the FAR, there are three basic categories of 
contracts authorized for use: fixed-price, incentive and 
cost-reimbursement contracts. In fixed-price contracts, the 
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contractor has the obligation to deliver a product on time or 
perform a service in accordance with the terms and conditions 
of the contract. Fixed-price contracts are not practical when 
some uncertainty in design, the specifications, or the cost of 
performance exists. In these circumstances, incentive or 
cost-reimbursement contracts must be used in set forth in the 
FAR. 
Incentive contracts are appropriate when a significant 
amount of uncertainty exists regarding the level of effort and 
cost required to accomplish the task successfully. These 
contracts provide contractors with motivation so as to enhance 
contract performance and product quality ensuring that 
contractors are rewarded for good performance and quality 
assurance, advanced schedule. Thus, incentive contracts 
properly applied and with a contractor who is motivated by the 
incentives, can be powerful tool to challenge industry to 
superior performance. 
Cost-Reimbursement contracts are used only when it is not 
appropriate to use any type of fixed-price or incentive 
contract without including a large contingency fee. Under 
these types of contracts, contractors are reimbursed for all 
allowable incurred costs to the extent prescribed in the 
contract. This differentiates cost type contracts from 
fixed-price contracts. In all of the fixed-price contracts, 
the actual costs incurred by the contract have no effect on 
the Government agreement to pay a price equal to the firm 
price specified in the contract. Therefore, relating to 
control of the costs of performance, the contractor shall 
avoid a loss or make a profit under the fixed-price 
arrangement. On the other hand, under a cost-type 
arrangement, the level of actual costs incurred is mostly 
affected by both the contractor's obligation to perform and 
the Government's willingness to reimburse the expense of that 
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performance or to continue reimbursing the contractor for 
costs incurred ln excess of that estimated amounts. 
Generally, the cost type contract requires that contractor's 
accounting system must be adequate for determining cost 
applicable to contract, and contractor will be subject to 
surveillance to assure use of efficient methods and effective 
cost controls. 
The FAR provides a contracting officer with wide variety 
of contract types available. But, in some aspects, the 
language of the FAR is subject to interpretation. Therefore, 
the contracting officer's decision for selecting an 
appropriate type of contract pertinent to the particular 
contract requires an acute sensitivity to acquisition 
environment, the organization and personnel involved, and 
participants' fully understanding of the plans, processes and 
special factors affect risk and uncertainty. 
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III. KOREAN DOD CONTRACT SYSTEMS 
A. CONTRACTING SYSTEM OF KOREAN DOD 
Korean DOD procurement is procurement by regulation. 
Unlike the U.S., Korean DOD regulations applicable to 
contracts for acquisition or procurement are differently 
applied according to the types of supplies. In general, 
supplies acquired by Korean DOD are categorized into two 
types: ( 1) general supplies and ( 2) defense supplies. The 
general supplies which are commercial type items, refer to all 
supplies acquired by Korean DOD except the defense supplies. 
The defense supplies are military items which can be purchased 
from defense industrial firms. This categorization of 
supplies purchased by the Korean DOD results from the 
particular procurement environment which characterizes 
exclusive sales contracts. In general, the defense industry 
lS characterized by monopolism with high risk and 
uncertainties of cost, performance and delivery. The 
Government is a unique customer that requires contractors to 
invest additional long-term capital for research and 
development, mass production facilities and to rigid quality 
control systems. These conditions can lead to a marketplace 
with very few willing participants--a monopolistic 
marketplace. Under a monopolistic environment, it is 
difficult to ensure that the procurement will be conducted by 
the use of competitive negotiation. In the procurement of 
general supplies which are related to the full scale 
implementation of commercial business practices, suppliers can 
reduce cost, performance and deli very risks. Thus the 
Government can acquire products needed at a fair and 
reasonable price through price competition. This includes 
best value contracting, which presents low price, high quality 
and quick response. 
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There are two basic categories of current contract 
regulations related to government procurement. A procurement 
of general supplies lS regulated by the Budget and Accounting 
Act, the Contract Treatment Regulation which is the Ministry 
of Finance (MOF) Directive, and the Expected Price Computation 
Principle. 
The Budget and Accounting Act was established in 1921 to 
provide the Government with instructions and guidance for the 
compilation and commitment of the budget. Thus, Government 
procurement, a major part of the budget, is regulated by this 
law. Additionally, for the Government to acquire general 
supplies, the Contract Treatment Regulation and Expected Price 
Computation were established in order to meet the requirements 
of effective, economical contract execution. The Government 
procurement of general supplies requires full and open 
competition ln a free market. In a free market, more 
suppliers will enter based on the belief that there is a great 
potential for profits. It is obvious that as many suppliers 
enter the market, they will lower their price in order to get 
a contract award. Thus, the general supplies are usually 
acquired in competitive markets, resulting in the lowest 
contract prlce, and consequently creating a significant 
savings to the Government while adequately filling the 
Governments needs. 
Meanwhile, the Korean Government established a set of 
regulations for the acquisition of defense supplies, such as 
the Special Enforcement Act for Defense Industry, the Contract 
Treatment Regulation for Defense Industry (a DOD Directive), 
and the Cost Computation Standard for Defense Supplies. 
It is the particular characteristic of Korean DOD 
contracting system that the Korean Government has established 
and implemented separate regulations for defense supplies. 
Concerning current regulations, there exist distinctive 
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differences in cost computation methods between defense 
supplies and general supplies in that who and how to decide 
rates of a indirect cost, such as indirect labor rate, 
indirect overhead rate, general and administrative(G&A), and 
profit. In defense supplies, the Minister of Defense 
determines all indirect cost rates which are published 
annually. 
In general supplies, the profit is applied based on the 
rate determined by the Minister of Finance, and other indirect 
cost rates as determined by the Head of Supply Department 
within Department of Defense. It is the Korean DOD policy 
that the Government reimburses all incurred costs on the 
contract for the defense supplies to the contractor, and pays 
a preset price on the contract for the general supplies. This 
policy illustrates that the Government has a tendency to 
protect the defense industrial firms for the purpose of 
national security. Further, the Government designates one, 
or two defense industrial firms in accordance with business 
type for the acquisition of defense supplies. The designation 
of defense industrial firms is stipulated in the Special 
Enforcement Act for Defense Industry. 
The defense industry firms are appointed by the Minister 
of Commerce and Industry with the deliberation of the Minister 
of Defense In accordance with this act. [Ref.7 : sec.S] 
This creates a non-competitive 
establishes weak industrial base. 
contract environment and 
Because of the existing 
vulnerable defense industrial base, the Korean Government was 
to become so dependent on a very small number of defense 
industrial firms that their ability to produce a weapon system 
or other military item deemed critical to national security 
was jeopardized. Some contractors are driven by patriotism 
but most recognize that there are profits to be earned through 
Government contracts. The risk of buying supplies from 
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single or dual sources affects the methods of procurement: 
sealed bidding, negotiation. One consequence is that most 
Government contracts for the acquisition of defense supplies 
have been awarded by the non-competitive negotiation, not by 
competitive bidding. More specifically, current Government 
regulations implicitly allow contracting without full and open 
competition. Thus the Government interest in obtaining the 
best possible products and services at the best possible 
prices will be seriously injured. As another consequence, 
the Government has assumed a high degree of cost risk. The 
Korean DOD has paid all incurred costs during contract 
performance to the contractor without substantial analysis of 
actual contract cost data. 
In the United States, all contracts with U.S. Government 
agencies must comply with the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) 
and Cost Principles which are incorporated into FAR. The FAR 
Part 30 lists nineteen cost accounting standards. They are 
designed to ensure that companies dealing with the U.S. 
Government conduct their accounting practices in a known or 
identifiable fashion such that government personnel can check 
each contractor's financial/accounting records for determining 
the reasonableness of various costs. Meanwhile, the Korean 
Government failed to establish a set of guidelines, such as 
CAS or the Cost Principles, for contracting officers to 
determine the adequacy of a contractor's cost estimating 
system. If a contracting officer can not detect a 
contractor's cost overrun, he cannot prevent overpriced 
contracts, and in turn, a waste of defense funds. It is true 
that the Korean DOD typically pays all incurred costs during 
contract performance to the contractor without any cost 
analysis or with ineffective cost analysis. This is usually 
because the contracting officer does not select a contract 
type that would allow for cost analysis. Of the various 
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contract types described 1n Korean regulations, a few are 
applied only to the defense industrial supplies, while the 
government acquires general supplies through price competition 
or firm-fixed price contracts only. 
A contracting officer should know that selection of right 
type of contract can result in significant cost savings and is 
in the best interest to the Government. Moreover, Government 
regulations should provide contracting officers with adequate 
authority and detailed instructions for the selection of a 
contract type. 
B. CONTRACT TYPES OF KOREAN DOD 
The Korean Government has some alternative types of 
contracts which can be used to accomplish best value buying. 
There are eight types of contracts applicable to the 
acquisition of defense supplies and two types of contracts 
that can be used for general supplies. As mentioned before, 
the Korean Government regulations for contracts are subject to 
the types of supplies government wants to buy. Two major 
regulations, Special Enforcement Act for Defense Industry, and 
Contract Treatment Regulation for Defense Industry were 
established by the Government for the purpose of governing DOD 
contracts for the acquisition of defense supplies, services or 
research and development (R&D) . They were also issued to 
authorize various contract types from which a contracting 
officer can choose. 
The alternative types of contracts set forth in those two 
regulations can be divided into two broad categories, as 
follows. 
1. Fixed-price contracts 
* firm-fixed price contract 
* fixed-unit cost contract 
25 
2. Cost-reimbursement contracts 
* fixed-price with redetermination contract 
* cost savings-reimbursement contract 
* fixed-price for special cost items contract 
* fixed-price incentive contract 
* general cost-reimbursement contract 
* cost-plus-fixed fee contract 
The contract types above can be applied only to the 
contract for acquisition of defense supplies. On the other 
hand, there are two types of contracts available for the 
contract for the acquisition of general supplies under the 
Budget and Accounting Act. In addition to the two contract 
types described in the Budget and Accounting Act, the Korean 
DOD allows a contracting officer to use six more contract 
types on the defense supplies contracts. 
In the United States, all contract types set forth in the 
FAR are commonly applied to all Government contracts. 
Compared to the U.S. use of contract types, the Korean 
Government has established several unique contract types, such 
as the fixed-unit cost contract, the fixed-price for special 
cost i terns contract, the cost-plus-fee contract, the cost 
savings-reimbursement contract, and the general cost 
reimbursement contract. They are described in the latter part 
of this chapter. 
C. PROBLEMS OF USING CURRENT CONTRACT TYPES 
The researcher interviewed individuals 1n the Department 
of Supply within the Korean DOD. As a result of these 
interviews, it became apparent that two problems exist 
relating to the use of contract types in the Government. 
(1) Although two regulations provide a contracting 
officer with various contract types, the language of the 
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regulations is subject to interpretation. There is ambiguity 
in the definition, concept, and applications of each contract 
type in the regulations. 
( 2) The use of a general cost-reimbursement 
specified in the regulations is preferred by 
contract 
both the 
Government and contractors rather than other types of 
contracts. On occasion, an intended contract type is modified 
because of a contracting anxiety driven by frequent audit and 
investigations. 
In the researcher's opinion, the 
result of the ambiguous wording ln 
first 
the 
problem lS a 
regulations. 
Government procurement regulations seriously effect the 
efficiency and effectiveness of a large portion of Government 
contracts. Considering the sheer magnitude of DOD contract 
expenditures or the large volume of business with government 
contractors, the role of Government regulations can be 
significant. 
Basically, DOD procurement personnel and Defense 
contractors are required to become familiar with the 
Government methods of doing business and with contents of the 
regulations. The Government process may be complex and 
difficult to master. Thus Government contract regulations 
should be clearly prescribed and more detailed in order to 
reduce the misinterpretation and pitfalls that may arise from 
the vague language of regulations. The Government procurement 
regulations are also critical in that conflict and 
contractor's protests may be created by the ambiguous language 
of regulations. Therefore, it is necessary that Government 
regulations covering DOD contracts should be drafted with 
definite language. Current Korean DOD regulations contain the 
potential for different interpretations which can lead to 
varying application of the regulations to DOD contracts. It 
is recognized that the regulations left out many definitions 
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of contract terminology and failed to classify the contract 
types distinctively in terms of the concepts, applications of 
types of contracts. This makes it difficult for a contracting 
officer to understand the content of regulations and to decide 
the best contract type for the contract. These results may 
lead to additional pressure being placed on a contracting 
officer to be knowledgeable in contract types concerned. This 
increased work load may cause great delays in executing his 
contract and make it difficult to expect an already 
overburdened 
adequately. 
contracting officer to perform his duty 
There 1s an imperative need for the systematic 
restructuring and rewriting of the regulations. Korean DOD 
regulations should be meaningful, more definitive and more 
detailed guidance for a contracting officer to facilitate 
effective management of DOD contracting operations or control 
the policies and practices of the Government contractors. 
Consequently, these improvements would result in less 
adversarial relationships and more profitable and efficient 
contract implementation. 
Based on the interview conducted by the researcher, the 
second problem is primarily related to the Government cost 
control. Selection of an appropriate contract type is 
required before the contracting officer can perform cost 
analysis or review a contractor's cost estimating system. A 
cost estimating system 1s the policies, procedures, and 
practice used by contractors to generate cost estimates and 
other data included in contract price proposals. The 
Government contracts require contractors to maintain an 
appropriate cost estimating system and to submit accurate, 
complete, and current cost and pricing data. To answer the 
concern that contractor's inefficient cost estimating systems 
can 1ncrease contract prices, Government procurement 
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regulations should include detailed standards or rigid, 
specific regulatory guidance contractors should comply with. 
In the case of the Korean Government, since there are so 
many undesirable non-competitive contracting situations, it is 
absolutely critical that DOD regulations establish stringent 
rules or requirement governing contractor estimating systems. 
Additionally, contracting officers and contract auditors 
should fully comply with them. Therefore, every contracting 
official in DOD is expected to attain an appropriate level of 
skill for evaluating cost and price data and negotiating 
price. 
Among DOD regulations, the Cost Computation Standard for 
Defense Supplies (CCS) provides regulatory guidelines for 
governing contractor estimating systems. The CCS was issued 
by the Korean DOD in order to prohibit Government contractors 
from overstating contract prices. Cost and pricing data 
submitted by a contractor to the Government should comply with 
the requirements pursuant to CCS. This researcher found that 
it is generally recognized that there is a lack of adequate 
standards in current DOD regulations and the CCS should be 
further developed. Interviewees in DOD positions stated that 
the Korean DOD should establish criteria for determining 
allowable, allocable costs, and regulations should inclu de 
the definition of cost items allowed, the cost pools and the 
permissible allocation bases. Current regulations do not 
provide sufficient, detailed guidance for contracting officers 
so that they can become experts in cost or pricing analysis. 
This situation also makes it difficult for contracting 
officers to select an appropriate contract types for a 
contract. Recent DOD contract price mechanisms have become 
more complex, as the complexity of the items being purchased 
increases. Incentive and cost-reimbursement type contracts 
require contracting officers and contractors to make intensive 
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efforts to reach pricing agreements. These types of contracts 
have also become a major controversial issues. The audit for 
DOD contracting activities is conducted annually by the Korean 
General Accounting Office (GAO) headed by the Comptroller 
General and intermittently by the DOD itself audit team headed 
by the Minister of Defense. The audit and investigation 
activities of the GAO and DOD audit teams have greatly 
impacted on DOD procurement process. 
Generally, audit objectives on negotiated contracts 
include cost issues. The GAO primarily expresses its concerns 
as follows: 
(1) the selection of contract type; 
(2) a review of the contractor's cost and pricing data; 
(3) a comparison of the contractor's initial cost 
estimates with his cost experience; 
(4) a review of incurred cost for cost-reimbursement type 
contracts. 
Therefore, increased oversight and audit action relevant 
the deficiencies in DOD regulations would lead contracting 
officers and contractors to prefer cost-type contracts. They 
would be tempted to make an imprudent decision 1n the 
selection of a contract type to avoid being evaluated as poor 
performance assessment. Such temptations would become more 
pronounced if contracting officers are frequently transferred. 
Regarding the above two problems, it is very important is that 
DOD regulations prescribe contract types with definite 
language so that contracting officers can fully understand the 
concept of each type of contract and its applications. 
1. Firm Fixed-Price Contract (FFP) 
This type of contract is used when a contracting officer 
can establish fair and reasonable prices and it is expected 
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that there is no subsequent change in contract prlce during 
the contract performance. [Ref.7:sec 32.1] 
The FFP contract shall be used only when the contracting 
officer establishes the estimate of expected costs of 
performance on the basis of available cost or pricing 
information. [Ref.8: sec 2.4] 
This is simply an agreement for the Government to make 
payments of a fixed amount as specified in the contract for 
the timely deli very of an end-i tern or defined service ln 
accordance with the contract specifications. However, current 
DOD regulations do not provide a definition of FFP and allow 
a contracting officer to use FFP contracts under limited 
conditions. This may make it difficult for a contracting 
officer to understand the FFP concept and to distinguish FFP 
from other contract types. Further, this type of contract can 
be used if the contracting officer can establish fair and 
reasonable price on the basis of reasonably definite 
functional or detailed specifications. The FFP contract can 
provide certain advantages to the Government and the 
contractor. The FFP contract gives the contractor the highest 
possibility for substantial profits to produce efficiently, 
and also minimize Government administration and audit 
controls. In addition, a fixed- price contract can be used 
despite serious doubt concerning the stability of the market 
or labor conditions. The fixed-price contract with economic 
price adjustment, or escalation set forth in the FAR can be a 
good example. It provides for equitable adjustment or other 
revision to the contract price upon on the occurrence of 
stated contingencies. Korean DOD regulations should provide 
a contracting officer with more flexibility to choose FFP 
contract by adding new clauses, or provisions. 
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2. Fixed-Unit Cost Contract (FUC} 
This type of contract is used when the Government buys 
items that have been purchased recently by the Government 
(within two years) and that have a negotiated contract for 
less than 20,000,000 won. The contracting officer determines 
contract price on the basis of past unit cost data rather than 
cost estimates. However, the Government has yet to use this 
type of contract. 
The Table 1. below, from Logistic Supply Headquarters, 
presents the awarded contracts in terms of number of actions 
and values in wons in Fiscal Year (FY) 1992. 
(unit: a hundred million won) 
Value of Award below 20,000,000 over 20,000,000 Total 
Action(%) 15 (4) 391(96) 406(100) 
Won(%) 1 ( 0) 10,986(100) 10,987(100) 
Table 1. Contract Awards in FY 1992 
There were very few contracts applicable to the 
fixed-unit cost contract. The data shows that this type of 
contract is impractical to current contracting situations in 
that the contract price applicable to FUC contracts is too low 
and it does not allow cost adjustment according to the 
fluctuations of the marketplace after past contract award. 
Therefore, this type of contract fails to give the contractor 
favorable incentives. 
3. Fixed Price with Redetermination Contract (FPR} 
This type of contract may be used for the acquisition of 
full scale production soon after initial production if there 
is a lack of time to establish expected costs. [Ref.8:sec.11.1] 
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Under an FPR contract, when negotiated, a temporary estimated 
price lS established initially. After some periods of 
performance, the incurred costs are analyzed, future costs are 
estimated and a fixed price is determined for the remainder of 
the contract. [Ref.8: sec.12.1] 
With regard to the above provlslons prescribed in the 
regulations, a redetermination point and requirement for 
specifying a redetermination point in the contract document 
are not included. The delay of price redetermination may lead 
the Government to assume the great cost risk. The earlier in 
the life of contract that price redetermination can be made, 
the more effective the FFP is. Thus, the Government should 
negotiate with contractor when price redetermination can be 
made and then include that in contract documents. The 
regulations also prescribe inappropriate application of the 
FPR. Award of a contract for the acquisition of full scale 
production supplies without evaluation of a result of initial 
production is not in the Governments best interest, because 
the Government may assume too great a cost risk. Thus, it is 
impractical that the FPR contract apply to the acquisition of 
initial production items. 
4. General Cost-Reimbursement Contract (GCR} 
This type of contract is used for investigation, study or 
initial production 
area. [Ref.8:sec.18] 
in a specific research and development 
This type of contract provides that the 
contractor shall be paid for all allowable cost without 
limitation plus a fee. The fee lS a percentage of the all 
allowable cost. The profit rate to be applied is one which 
the Minister of Defense designates. The rate is annually 
updated pursuant to the Cost Computation Standard for Defense 
Industry. It is similar to the Cost-Plus-Percentage-of-Cost 
contract which is outlawed for use by the U.S. Government. 
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This is the most undesirable of all types of contracts. The 
contractor most likely to increase his costs in order to 
obtain greater profits. As the contractor increases actual 
costs, the fee will be increased proportionately. Despite of 
the obvious fallacy in the concept of, "the higher the cost 
the greater the profit", this type of contract has frequently 
been used for research and development and full scale 
production supplies. 
It is true that this type of contract does not provide 
the contractor with any incentives for cost sav1ngs. 
Adversely, it may cause a contractor to overstate the contract 
price unless the Government controls the contractor's cost 
estimating system effectively. Regarding to these 
disadvantages, it is desirable to outlaw this contract type or 
if necessary, the applications of this contract type should 
be greatly limited just only for research and development or 
initial production. 
5. Cost Savings Reimbursement Contract (CSR) 
A cost sav1ngs reimbursement contract lS used when a 
contracting officer or the contractor expects cost savings 
during contract performance through technical development or 
efficient management operations, and a contracting officer can 
establish an accurate expected cost. [Ref.8:sec.5] Both the 
contracting officer and the contractor can propose a cost 
savings plan by mutual agreement and the proposal should be 
submitted to the Inspection Agency under Defense Science 
Research Center for technical evaluation prior to negotiation. 
If approved by the Inspection Agency, the proposal lS 
submitted to the contracting officer. The formula for 
determination of reimbursement depends on who proposed the 
cost savings plan. If the contractor proposes the cost savings 
plan, the contractor lS reimbursed all of the cost savings, 
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and if a contracting officer, the contractor is reimbursed 25 




= negotiated price cost savings + 
During the performance of the contract, the Inspection 
Agency reviews the contractor's efforts to meet the cost 
savings plan. Upon completion, the contracting officer is to 
compute the amount of cost savings resulting from contractor's 
efforts and then decide the amount of reimbursement to be 
paid. The contracting officer has to justify his computations 
of cost savings and reimbursement. Thus, the contracting 
officer would avoid choosing this type of contract. 
Actually, the justification of cost savlngs and 
reimbursement computed will increase the work load for the 
contracting officer, and the contracting officer may assume 
the risk of a disciplinary dismissal if he fails to justify 
his decision. 
6. Fixed-Price for Special Cost Items Contract 
This type of contract may be used where the contracting 
officer can not compute costs of all cost items of a cost 
pool. [Ref. 7: sec. 32.4] Under this type of contract, the 
costs of special cost items which can be computed by the 
contracting officer are negotiated as a fixed price, and the 
costs of the rest of a cost pool are added to the final price 
after completion of the contract. The contracting officer 
determines the reimbursement costs for the special cost items 
on the basis of cost and pricing data submitted by the 
contractor during the performance of the contract. With 
regard to the application of this type of contract, it is 
authorized to be use when the cost computation for some cost 
items is possible. This provision makes it difficult for a 
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contracting officer to differentiate this type of contract 
from the general cost reimbursement contract. According to 
the regulations, both the fixed-price for special cost items 
contract and the general cost-reimbursement contract can be 
used whether or not a contracting officer can compute costs of 
all cost items. In cases where the contracting officer cannot 
compute costs of some of the cost items of a cost pool, he can 
use a fixed-price for special cost items, or a general 
cost-reimbursement contract despite the fact that they are 
different types of contracts with different administrative 
requirements. To make a clear distinction between these 
contract types, this type of contract should be allowed to be 
used when the contracting officer can compute costs of most of 
the cost items of a cost pool, not just some of the cost items 
of a cost pool. 
7. Cost-Plus-Fixed Fee Contract (CPFF) 
The CPFF contract provides for reimbursement of all 
actual costs and payment of a fixed-fee regardless of the 
contractor's actual cost experience. The fixed-fee cannot 
exceed the ceiling rate determined by the Minister of Defense. 
This contract type is used for contracts greater than ten 
billion wons (reimbursed cost), or it is used when a fixed-fee 
is required because of a special production process or special 
business condition. [ Ref.8: sec.l5 ] 
In the past, this type of contract has never been used by 
the Korean DOD. This indicates that there are some problems 
in the regulations describing this type of contract. Under 
the regulations, the application of this type of contract is 
inappropriate. More specifically, it is difficult for the 
Government to justify the establishment of a fixed-fee in 
advance and to establish the criteria for determining the fee. 
Thus, the applications of this type of contract should be 
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limited. This contract type may be appropriate to the 
contract for large size business or research projects and 
initial production where there is a substantial degree of 
uncertainty in the performance cost of the contract effort. 
Generally, this type of contract offers no incentives, 
thus a contractor tends to minimize his incentive to perform 
in a cost efficient manner. Hence its use is discouraged and 
should be used only as a last method. 
D. SUMMARY 
Considering the unique Korean DOD contracting environment 
characterized as non-competitive, the acquisition and 
contracting process must be able to ensure that the Korean DOD 
procures high quality defense supplies at reasonable prices, 
and with a quick response. The Korean DOD can no longer bear 
the risks of having incidents of waste, fraud, and abuse of 
scarce defense funds. Establishing effective contract 
regulations is a good method to reduce the cost of acquiring 
supplies and services. 
Furthermore, Contract types to be used must be employed 
to accomplish best value procurements. Selection of an 
appropriate contract type is a critical element to effective 
procurement in the Government. 
However, Korean DOD regulations for contract types need 
to be modified for the purpose of improving the contracting 
system. As previously mentioned, contract types set forth in 
DOD regulations are divided into two broad categories: 
fixed-price contracts, and cost reimbursement contracts. 
Current fixed-price contracts require more flexibility so that 
they can be used even though there are uncertainties, or 
economic fluctuations in labor or material costs during the 
performance of the contract. Under current regulations, the 
contracting officer cannot use fixed-price contracts, because 
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he cannot provide price adjustments necessary to protect the 
contractor and the Government. For this reason, the 
Government and the contractor typically resort to the use of 
cost-reimbursement contracts. In cost-reimbursement 
contracts, DOD regulations leave out many definitions of terms 
related to contract types. Additionally, the regulations do 
not specify each contract type with distinct language. The 
contracting officer must make greater efforts to understand 
what each contract type is, when it can be used. It is 
difficult for the contracting personnel to differentiate 
between cost-reimbursement types. For example, as mentioned 
before, both a general cost-reimbursement contract and 
fixed-price for special cost items contract can be used in 
same situation. This may cause contracting personnel to have 
difficulty in the selection of appropriate contract type. It 
may also create unintended delays in the contracting process. 
Concerning effective contract execution, the regulations 
should define and describe each contract type precisely so 
that the contracting officer can choose best contract type 
appropriate to the particular contracting environment. In a 
word, the contracting system must not allow a lack of 
understanding of the regulations to defeat the benefits of 
best value buying. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
South Korea exists under a unique set of internal and 
external conditions. Korea has had to cope with a continuing 
serious threat to its national security. Under these 
circumstance, the primary concern for the Korean Government is 
the nurturing of a defense capability which will adequately 
counter possible aggression by an unaided North Korea. Thus, 
Korea has endeavored to strengthen its independent defense 
capability. In 1973, the laws on military supplies were 
passed, under which various measures were taken to foster and 
support defense industries. They include two regulations 
which prescribe contractual favors, such as Special Treatment 
Act for Defense Industry and Contract Treatment Regulation for 
Defense Industry. 
Korea's defense industry has developed on the basis of 
national economic development plans fully utilizing the civil 
industrial facilities within the country. In addition, the 
Korean Government has designated defense firms for the 
acquisition of defense supplies. The intent of two 
regulations and designation of defense firms was to ensure 
that DOD acquires defense supplies from defense firms that 
could produce the supplies cost-effectively through use of 
proper contract type described in the regulations. 
However, as a result of this study, this researcher 
reached the conclusion that there are several problems in the 
regulations applicable to DOD contracts for defense supplies. 
One of most serious problems is that while the Government has 
made great efforts to accelerate the development of the 
defense industry, it has created a non-competitive contracting 
environment. Specifically, as part of DOD's efforts to 
accelerate the development of defense industry, excessive 
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protection and contractual favors were given to defense firms. 
In addition, the DOD's designation of defense firms has 
allowed little room for private initiative and creativity. 
The DOD lacks the competitive advantages that may preclude the 
wasting of defense funds stemming from increases in contract 
prices. 
The second problem has to do with existing ambiguity and 
inappropriateness if provisions addressing the concepts, 
applications and limitations of contract types. This may make 
it difficult for contracting officers to select an appropriate 
contract type suitable to a glven contracting situation. 
Consequently, General Cost-Reimbursement Contracts and 
Firm-Fixed-Price Contracts are preferred by contracting 
officers and contractors because of the simple procedures and 
the reduced burden of frequent audits and investigations. 
The third problem has to do with the fact that there are 
impractical types of contracts which create inefficient and 
ineffective DOD contracts. Those contract types should be 
either eliminated or limited their use. For example, 
Fixed-Unit Cost contracts are considered inefficient, 
uneconomical contract type and should be removed as an option. 
General Cost-Reimbursement Contracts which provide no 
incentives for cost savings should either be removed or 
strictly limited in their application. 
The fourth problem stems from the lack of rules or 
standards to control contractor's cost accounting system. 
Since cost-type contracts are preferred by contracting 
officers and contractors, DOD pays all incurred costs to the 
contractors. DOD should establish effective, rigid rules to 
improve the fairness of contract price and determine the 
allowability of costs. 
From above conclusions, it is clear that revisions of DOD 
regulations for contract types are necessary. However, it 
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should be noted that revisions to DOD regulations will not 
radically change the way DOD procurement is being done, and it 
will merely provide DOD contracting officials with more 
detailed, more comprehensive regulations to implement DOD 
contracts. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are proposed for revlslng 
the DOD contracting system. 
1. Add provisions for definitions of contract terms, more 
specific applications and limitations of contract 
types to the Contract Treatment Regulation for Defense 
Industry 
In current DOD regulations, definitions of contract terms 
related to contract procedures and contract types are 
excluded, such as the criteria for determining contract type, 
definitions of expected cost, etc. Consistent use of contract 
terms, and the clear criteria for their use would resolve the 
ambiguity in interpretation and implementation of DOD 
regulations. 
2. Abolish the use of Fixed-Unit Cost Contract and 
enforce restriction on the use of General 
Cost-Reimbursement Contract 
Since the Fixed-Unit Cost Contract does not reflect the 
fluctuation of the economic situation, it does not provide 
contractors with incentives, or enticement to use this type of 
contract. Thus it should be prohibited in DOD contracts. The 
General Cost-Reimbursement Contract makes the Government bear 
a great cost risk and, in turn, it results in abuse or the 
waste of scarce defense funds. Therefore, the use of General 
Cost-Reimbursement Contract should be allowed only for 
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research and development or contract for initial production 
supplies. 
3. Provide more alternative contract types to be used, 
such as Fixed-Price Contracts with Economic Price 
Adjustment, Fixed-Price Contracts with Prospective 
Price Redetermination, and Incentive Contract Types 
which include Cost-Plus Incentive Fee contract, 
Cost-Plus-Award Fee Contract. 
The government should provide contracting officers with 
flexible fixed-price contract which provide a firm price or in 
appropriate cases, an adjustable price. In some instances, 
fixed-price contracts providing for an adjustable price may be 
more effective rather than other cost type contracts 
protecting the contractor and the Government against 
significant fluctuation of economic price. Meanwhile, 
incentive contracts are appropriate when a significant amount 
of uncertainty exists regarding the level of effort required 
to accomplish the task properly. These types of contracts 
motivate contractors to improve contract performance or 
advance the date of deliveries. Thus, the Government should 
provide contracting officers with those flexible contract 
types to be used properly. 
4. Provide additional rules or guidelines to determine 
pr1ce reasonableness and support cost realism. 
Currently, the Government applies Cost Computation 
Standard for Defense Supplies to estimate an expected cost and 
evaluate the contractor's cost and pricing data to determine 
the reimbursement to be paid to the contractor. This standard 
is not enough to determine allowability of incurred cost in 
cost-reimbursement contracts. It 1s imperative that the 
Government establish additional rules, or standards, to ensure 
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PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE CONTRACT TREATMENT REGULATION 
Part 1. General Rule. 
It is amended by adding definitions of words and terms. 
1.2 Definitions of Words and Ter.ms. 
This part defines words and terms commonly used in 
this regulation. Other terms are defined in this part or 
subpart with which they are particularly associated. 
(1) Contract means a mutually binding legal 
relationship obligating the contractor to furnish the supplies 
or services(including construction) and the Government to pay 
for them. It includes all types of commitments that obligate 
the Government to an expenditure of appropriated funds and 
that, except as otherwise authorized, are in writing. 
(2) Contracting means purchasing, renting, leasing, 
or otherwise obtaining supplies or services from 
non-Government sources. Contracting includes description(but 
not determination) of supplies and services required, 
selection and solicitation of sources, preparation and award 
of contracts, and all phases of contract administration. It 
does not include making grants or cooperative agreements. 
(3) Contracting office means an office that awards 
or executes a contract for supplies or services and performs 
post award functions not assigned to a contract administration 
office. 
( 4) Contracting officer means a person with the 
authority to enter into, administer, and make related 
determinations and findings. The term includes certain 
authorized representatives of the contracting officer acting 
within the limits of their authority as delegated by the 
contracting officer. 
(5) National defense means any activity related to 
programs for military or atomic energy production or 
construction, military assistance to any foreign nation, 
stockpiling, or space. 
(6) General supplies refers to the commercial type 
i terns which can be acquired by Department of Defense excluding 
the defense supplies. 
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(7) Defense supplies means military items which can 
be acquired from defense industrial firms. 
(8) Expected cost means the determined cost by a 
Contracting officer 1n order to contract fixed types of 
contracts prior to negotiation. 
(9) Reimbursed cost means the final redetermined 
cost to be paid by the Government to the contractor for the 
contract performance on the basis of actual incurred costs, 
mostly in general cost-reimbursement contract types. 
(10) Reimbursed price means the finally determined 
contract price for contract of cost-reimbursement contract 
types on the basis of reimbursed cost. 
(11) Contract price means the total amount fixed by 
the contract(which could be amended) to be paid for complete 
performance of the contract. 
( 12) Actual cost means the amounts determined on the 
basis of costs incurred, as distinguished from forecasted 
costs. 
( 13) Allocable cost means a cost which is assignable 
or changeable to one or more cost objective in accordance with 
the relative benefits received or other equitable 
relationship. 
( 14) Allowable cost means any cost which can be 
included in prices, cost reimbursements, or settlements under 
the contract to which it is allocable. A cost which means the 
tests of (a) reasonableness, (b) allocability, and (c) 
consonance with Expected Price Computation Principle. 
(15) Reasonable cost means a cost which in nature 
and amount does not exceed what would be incurred by an 
ordinarily prudent person ln the conduct of competitive 
business. 
(16) Fair and reasonable price refers to a price 
that is fair to both parties, considering the agreed-upon 
conditions, promised quality, and timeliness of contract 
performance. Although generally a fair and reasonable price 
is a function of the law of supply and demand, there are 
statutory, regulatory,and judgmental limits on the concept. 
describe 
( 17) Contract type refers to 
specific pricing arrangements 
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the term used to 
employed for the 
performance of work under contracts. Specific pricing 
arrangements expressed as contract types include fixed price 
contracts/ and cost-reimbursement contracts. 
(18) Fixed price contract means basic category of 
Government contract in which pricing arrangement is one 
involving an expected cost. Fixed price contract is usually 
awarded to the lowest responsible offeror. The force of 
competition ensures fair and reasonable pricing and protects 
the Government from paying too much. 
(19) Cost reimbursement 
category of Government contract 
arrangement is one involving the 
11 allowable 11 cost incurred by 
performance. 
contract means basic 
1n which the pricing 
Government 1 s payment of 
the contractor during 
(20) Cost or pricing data means all facts as of the 
time of price agreement that prudent buyers and sellers would 
reasonably expect to affect price negotiations significantly. 
Cost or pricing data are factual/ not judgmental/ and are 
therefore verifiable. Cost or pricing data are more than 
historical accounting data; they are all the facts that can be 
reasonably expected to contribute to the soundness of 
estimates of expected costs and to the validity of 
determinations of costs already incurred. 
1.3 Factors in selecting contract types. 
To determine the best type of contract to use/ the 
contracting officer should consider those factors in selecting 
and negotiating the contract type. They include the 
followings: 
(1) Price competition. Whenever possible/ 
activity should be competed. Effective price 
results in realistic pricing/ and a fixed-price 




(2) Price analysis. Price analysis/ with or without 
competition/ is the process by which the contracting officer 
analyzes proposed prices to determine whether the price 
offered is reasonable. It provides a basis for selecting the 
contract type/ includes comparing proposed prices with such 
things as historical prices/ market prices/ and other 
competitive quotes. 
(3) Cost analysis. Cost analysis involves the evaluation 
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of a contractor's cost and pricing data. These data are 
analyzed to determine the allowability and allocability of 
costs and the basis of Expected Price Computation Principle. 
(4) Type and complexity of the requirement. The 
contracting officer assesses the degree of risk assumed by 
both parties. Complex requirements, particularly those unique 
to the Government, usually result in greater risk assumption 
by Government. The more complex and uncertain the 
requirement, the greater the risk that will probably be 
accepted by the Government. 
(5) Urgency of the requirement. If urgency is a prlmary 
factor, the Government may choose to assume a greater portion 
of the cost risk of the contract, or it may offer incentives 
to ensure timely contract performance. 
(6) Period of performance or lenqth of production run. 
In times of economic uncertainty, contracts extending over a 
relatively long period may require economic price adjustment. 
(7) Adequacy of the contractor's accounting system. 
Before agreeing on a contract type other than firm-fixed-
price, the contracting officer shall ensure that the 
contractor's accounting system will permit timely development 
of all necessary cost data in the form required by the 
proposed contract type. This factor may be critical when the 
contract type requires price revision while performance is in 
progress, or when a cost-reimbursement contract is being 
considered and all current or past experience with the 
contractor has been on a fixed-price basis. 
( 8) Concurrent contracts. If the offeror holds other 
Government contracts, the contracting officer must determine 
what impact of those contacts will have on the proposed 
contract. 
Part 2. Content and Scope of Contract. 
2.1 Firm-Fixed Price Contract. 
It is amended by adding the significance of 
firm-fixed price contract before application(2.1-2). 
2.1-1 (Description) A firm-fixed price contract is not 
subject to any adjustment to its total price based on 
variation in the cost experience of the contractor in the 
performance of the contract. 
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2. 2 Fixed-Price with Economic Price Adjustment Contract. 
This type of contract is a substitute for fixed-unit 
cost contract. 
2. 2-1 (Description) A fixed-price contract with 
economic price adjustment provides for upward and downward 
revision of the stated contract price upon the occurrence of 
specified contingencies. 
2.2-2 (Application) A fixed-price contract with 
economic price adjustment may be used when (1) the changes of 
conditions is expected during the performance, and (2) an 
expected cost can be established on the basis of the Cost 
Computation Standard for Defense Supplies. It should be noted 
that price adjustment of this type apply only to changes in 
labor rates and materials costs, not to overhead and profit 
and not to increases in the amounts of labor or materials. 
price adjustments based on labor and material costs should be 
limited to contingencies beyond the contractor's control. 
2.3 Cost Savings Reimbursement Contract. 
It is amended by adding the significance of this 
type before application(2.3-2). 
2.3-1 (Description) This type of contract may be used 
to lead the contractor to reduce costs of the contract by the 
Government's promise to reimburse cost savings as a result of 
contractor's effort. 
2.4 Fixed-Price Incentive Contract. 
It is amended by adding the significance of this 
contract type before application(2.4-2). 
2.4-1 (Description) A fixed-price incentive contract is 
a fixed-price contract that provides for adjusting profit and 
establishing the final contract price by a formula based on 
the relationship of final negotiated cost to total target 
cost. The final price is subjected to a price ceiling, 
negotiated at the outset. This type of contract may be used 
when a reasonable target price can be established but exact 
pricing is impossible without payment of a contingency. 
2.5 Fixed-price with Redetermination Contract. 
It is amended by adding the significance of this 
type before application (2. 5-2), and changed by inserting below 
new paragraph at the end of 2.5-3. 
2.5-1 (Description) A fixed-price with redetermination 
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contract may be used (1) when fixed-price contract can not be 
established, and (2) for providing prospective 
redetermination, at a stated time or times during performance, 
of the price for subsequent periods of performance. 
2.5-2 (Application) A fixed-price with redetermination 
contract may be used in acquisition of initial production 
supplies or research and development. The contract may be 
provide for a ceiling price based on evaluation of the 
uncertainties involved in performance and their possible cost 
impact. 
2.5-3 (Determination of contract price) 
2.5-3-2 The price redetermination point in the 2.5-3-1 
means the time which cost computation can be established after 
some periods of times or some amounts of production. The 
price redetermination point should be stated in the contract 





for Special cost Item Contract. 
of contract is amended by adding 
application(2.6-2), and by changing 
2.6-1 (Description) A fixed-price for special cost item 
contract is one which determines contract price for special 
item which cost computation can not be established at the 
negotiation table. Such contract price for special i terns 
shall be determined after completion of the contract. 
2.6-2 (Application) A fixed-price for special cost item 
contract may be used when a contracting officer can not 
compute costs of some cost items among cost pool. 
2.7 General Cost Reimbursement Contract. 
It is amended by adding significance and changing 
the application of general cost reimbursement contract. 
2.7-1 (Description) A general cost reimbursement 
contract may be used when an expected cost computation can not 
be established, and contract price can be determine after 
completion of the contract on the basis of actual incurred 
costs. The contractor can be paid by the Government for all 
allowable costs. 
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2.7-2 (Application) A general cost reimbursement 
contract shall be used when (1) the contract is for research 
and development or initial production supplies, and (2) any 
other contract types can not be used. 
2.8 Cost-Plus-Fixed Fee Contract. 
It is amended by adding significance and changing 
the application of a cost-plus-fixed fee contract. 
2.8-1 (Description) A cost-plus-fixed fee contract is a 
cost reimbursement contract which provides for the 
reimbursement of all allowable costs expended by the 
contractor. as well as payment to the contractor of fee which 
rema1ns fixed, regardless of the contractor's actual cost 
experience. 
2.8-2 (Application) A cost-plus-fixed fee contract may 
be used when (1) the contract is for performance of research 
and development and initial production supplies, ( 2) the 
contract price is 10 billion wons or more, and (3) the cost 
computation can not be established. 
2.9 Cost-Plus-Incentive Contract. 
This type of contract is proposed to use as a 
specific type of contract. 
2.9-1 (Description) A cost-plus-incentive contract is 
a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for initially 
negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a formula based on the 
relationship of total allowable costs to total target costs. 
2.9-2 (Application) A cost-plus-incentive fee contract 
is appropriate for development and test program when (1) a 
contract price can not be determined as a fixed price, (2)it 
is possible to predict the extent which range of variance of 
foreseeable actual cost, and ( 3) a target cost and a fee 
adjustment formula can be negotiated that are likely to 
motivate the contractor to manage effectively. This type of 
contract also provides following contract factors which should 








target profit(usually 10% of target cost) 
target price 
share formula (85/15) 
maximum profit (15% of target cost) 
minimum profit (7% of target cost) 
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Under this contract, the contractor is reimbursed all of 
his costs and does get at least a minimum fee even though 
there is a limitation on the maximum fee. 
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